Heroes and Victims:Fund Manager Sense-making, Self-legitimation and Storytelling by Eshraghi, Arman & Taffler, Richard
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heroes and Victims: Fund Manager Sense-making, Self-
legitimation and Storytelling
Citation for published version:
Eshraghi, A & Taffler, R 2012 'Heroes and Victims: Fund Manager Sense-making, Self-legitimation and
Storytelling'.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Author final version (often known as postprint)
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Eshraghi, A., & Taffler, R. (2012). Heroes and Victims: Fund Manager Sense-making, Self-legitimation and
Storytelling.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
 
 
1 
 
 
Heroes and Victims: Fund Manager Sense-making,                       
Self-legitimation and Storytelling 
 
 
Arman Eshraghi*                      Richard Taffler 
 
This version: 15 May 2013 
First version: 1 Apr 2011 
 
Abstract 
Abundant research evidence demonstrates that past investment performance is not a robust indicator 
of future investment returns, and that it is very difficult for fund managers to outperform on any 
consistent basis. To be able to do their job, asset managers need to maintain belief in themselves and 
in their investment processes, even though, in practice, it is not possible for them to meet the 
unrealistic expectations placed on them. In this paper, we show fund managers do this by constructing 
satisfying narratives and, in particular, stories. We use two sets of fund manager narratives in our 
study. First, we analyse the transcripts of depth interviews with 50 equity fund managers in some of 
the world’s largest investment houses. Second, we explore 50 fund manager commentaries on last 
year performance provided as a standard part of mutual fund annual reports to investors. In both 
cases, we show how storytelling is used by money managers as an integral part of their largely 
unconscious identity construction process, and to justify their added value to themselves as well as to 
their clients and employers. In this way, our two sets of narratives, one verbal and informal, the other 
written and formal, provide novel and complementary insights into how fund managers make sense of 
what they do. 
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Heroes and Victims: Fund Manager Sense-making, Self-legitimation and 
Storytelling 
 
1. Introduction 
There is little empirical evidence that fund managers are able systematically to outperform other 
managers or their respective benchmarks after costs (e.g., Carhart, 1997; Wermers, 2000; Busse, 
Goyal and Wahal, 2010; Fama and French, 2010), and particularly in more recent periods (e.g., 
Kosowski et al., 2006; Barras, Sciallet and Wermers, 2010).  In addition, very few funds (4-6%) 
manage to repeat top-half or top-quartile performance over time (Soe and Lou, 2012), and even 
what limited persistence there might be dissipates after a few months (Bollen and Busse, 2004). 
Also, if particular managers do have superior skill, it is very difficult to identify these ex ante 
(Jones and Wermers, 2011) and, more generally, distinguish skill from luck.   
On the other hand, the existence and legitimacy of the fund management industry itself, and the 
raison d’être of its asset managers, are premised on the belief, and implicit promise to clients, 
that it is possible to “beat the market”.1 This is despite all participants being aware, consciously 
or unconsciously, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to do this on a consistent basis. Fund 
managers, who are under constant threat if they underperform (Goyal and Wahal, 2008), suffer 
from cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). On the one hand they “know” it is not possible to 
do what is required of them, but on another level cannot consciously acknowledge this to 
themselves or others.
2
  In the operation of their ego-defences they have to split off and deny or 
repress what they do not want to know (Gabriel, 2008, pp.74-75; Brown, Stacey and 
Nandhakumar, 2008).
3
 This inevitably leads to emotional conflict (Tuckett and Taffler, 2012, pp. 
88-97).   
In this paper we explore how fund managers develop the required sense of self-belief and 
meaning in their work to allow them to continue to do their job when outcomes are uncertain and 
there is ultimately little relationship between the investment decisions they make and the 
performance of their funds.  Added to which they are more likely to underperform on average 
                                                          
1
 For example, Jain and Wu (2000) show how mutual funds are sold to potential clients on the basis of their 
managers’ previous track record and advertised as such even though, if anything, such funds subsequently 
underperform. 
2
 This point is well illustrated by the Dear Lucy column in the Financial Times (March 20, 2008) in which a 34-
year-old fund manager offered the following cri de coeur: “I have been a fund manager for 10 years…. The job 
is great: flexible and well paid.  My problem is that I genuinely don’t believe it is possible to do this job – 
outperforming other fund managers and equity indices – with any consistency. I believe the industry is based on 
the lie that fund managers add value through skill, rather than luck.  This makes it hard for me to keep 
motivated.” There were 79 responses on the associated FT blog, many not very sympathetic. 
3
 This point is made very clearly by one of Barker, Hendry, Roberts and Sanderson’s (2012) investment house 
heads of research interviewees when asked whether it is possible to outperform: “I think I will plead the 5th 
[amendment] on that one! I think I know the answer but it could be the job I do adds no value whatsoever in the 
long run!”  
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than outperform equity indices.
4
 In this context, Kahneman (2011, pp. 212-217) refers to the 
illusion of skill and how it is imbedded in the whole culture of the investment management 
industry. How do professional investors manage to maintain feelings of self-esteem and self-
legitimacy when they know, on one level, they can’t all be “exceptional”? 
We hypothesise that fund managers deal with their implicit search for meaning in an uncertain 
world by doing what we all do, by telling stories. As Brown, Stacey and Nandhakumar (2008) 
quoting MacIntyre (1981, p. 201) point out ‘man is in his actions and practice, as well as his 
fictions, essentially a story-telling animal.’  He is both  ‘homo narrans’ and indeed ‘homo 
fabulans – the tellers and interpreters of narrative.’  We then explore whether there are certain 
types or genres of story asset managers use to generate sense-making and seek self-legitimation 
both when they are successful and unsuccessful. We also test whether these story types are 
common across the stories they tell to themselves, and those narrated to their external 
constituencies.  
 
To provide evidence for our core argument, we analyse two sets of fund manager narratives in 
our study: (1) transcripts of depth interviews with 50 fund managers in some of the world’s 
largest investment houses, and (2) formal reports to their investors written by a different, 
randomly selected sample of 50 fund managers as a standard part of mutual fund annual reports. 
The main difference between the two sets of data is that while there was plenty of probing 
reflected in our semi-structured interviews, this was not possible with our formal reports with the 
process of sense-making being communicated here in a more subtle way. 
To our knowledge, there has been little formal study of the fund manager task environment to 
date, and what there has been has tended to take a much broader and indirect sociological 
perspective (e.g., Smith, 1999; McKenzie, 2006; Cetina and Preda, 2012; Pixley, 2012). Most 
similar to our study is Barker, Hendry, Roberts and Sanderson (2012) and the same authors’ 
earlier associated studies (Roberts, Sanderson, Barker and Hendry, 2006 and Hendry, Sanderson, 
Barker and Roberts, 2006). However, there are many parallels in what we find with Maclean, 
Harvey and Chia’s (2012) study of the sense-making, storytelling and legitimation processes of 
elite business leaders.  In their interview-based and observational study Barker, Hendry, Roberts 
and Sanderson (2012) explore why fund managers view company meetings as a prime 
information source even though no price-sensitive information is being conveyed, and provide 
three non-mutually exclusive potential explanations.  Although our study has a different focus, 
consistent with their third agency-based legitimacy argument our research suggests that the value 
of such meetings may well reside in the opportunity they provide for narrative sense-making, 
i.e., rationalising purposeful activity in the face of unpredictable trading outcomes.  Talim (2012) 
provides some support for this idea in his ethnographic participant-observation study of the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) which explores the use of sense-making narratives in situ. In 
particular, he shows how such narratives serve to reduce uncertainty and help explain the 
evaluative cultures of the ISE.  
                                                          
4
 For example, Standard & Poor’s show that over the five years to the end of 2011, the S&P 500 outperformed 
62% of actively managed large-cap mutual funds, and other relevant S&P indexes respectively outperformed 
80% of mid-cap funds and 73% of small-cap funds (Standard & Poor’s, 2011). 
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Tuckett and Taffler (2012) draw on the same interviews as those used in the first part of this 
study and describe the underlying unconscious dimensions of the fund manager task adopting a 
psychoanalytically-informed emotional finance perspective. In particular, they explore how asset 
managers are able to enter into relationships with, and invest in, stocks which are very likely to 
let them down, a process they term “achieving conviction”.  Despite being related to what we are 
doing in this paper, Tuckett and Taffler (2012) are not directly concerned with how asset 
managers make sense of and legitimate their activities to themselves and others, the research 
question we address here. The second part of our empirical analysis which analyses formal asset 
manager reports to investors complements that of Jameson (2000) who also studies mutual fund 
reports but in her case in an attempt to understand how business writers handle complex 
communication challenges. Her particular interest is in the process by which fund managers 
engage with users of their reports and how their readers experience the text and actively 
participate in constructing the investment story. In contrast, we are directly concerned with how 
fund managers write their reports not only to convince readers that their investments are being 
appropriately and prudently managed, but particularly to help them make sense of their task and 
both construct and maintain individual identities, i.e., for self-legitimation purposes.   
Whereas there has been some work looking at traders and retail investors in financial markets 
from a more behavioural perspective (e.g., Willman, Fenton-O’Creevy, Nicholson and Soame, 
2002; Roscoe and Howorth, 2009), studies on how financial actors make sense of an 
environment in which they are expected to “perform”, despite outcomes being largely outside 
their control, are limited. Specifically, in this paper we take both an internal perspective and also 
a presented external one in exploring fund manager narratives. Interestingly, we find through the 
process of abduction (Lukka and Modell, 2010; Weick, 2012) there are certain types or genres of 
story that fund managers commonly use to help them generate a sense of meaning in what they 
do. The two principal types of story they employ are those related in epic (i.e., with the fund 
manager as ‘hero’ when things work out) and tragic (i.e., with the fund manager as ‘undeserving 
victim’ when things go wrong) modes.  However, romantic and comic stories are also used as 
well as hybrid types such as tragi-comic and epic-comic. These genres are common across both 
fund managers’ own internal stories and those narrated to their external constituencies. In fact, it 
can be argued that asset managers are implicitly addressing the same sets of audience in both 
their confidential interviews and formal reports with recipients of their stories including 
themselves, both explicitly and implicitly, as well as their clients and employers. The particular 
taxonomy we apply to identify and categorise fund manager narratives into different story types 
and the results of this analysis are one of the main empirical contributions of our paper. 
Importantly, telling stories can make the unpredictable future appear predictable, and by 
imposing meaning can help the fund manager feel able to control the unpredictable world he has 
to deal with, and cope with adversity.
5
 Being able to tell a convincing story to himself and others 
about why things did not work out as expected ensures the fund manager can avoid 
acknowledging the underlying uncertainty with which he has to deal. This process is far more 
                                                          
5
 Gendron and Spira (2010) emphasise Giddens’ (1990) argument that self-identity has the key ability “to keep a 
particular narrative going – to integrate events meaningfully into one’s biographical story about the self.” Such 
individuals are, in Giddens’ terms, “ontologically secure”, having confidence “in the continuity of their self-
identity and the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action” (p. 92).   
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subtle than what is generally described in terms of impression management (see for example, 
Goffman, 1974; Schlenker, 1980 and Brennan, 2012), which suggests an almost conscious 
attempt to manage the perceptions of the target audience. In this paper, we argue that telling 
stories, as in other realms of human activity, is the underlying way in which asset managers 
make sense of the world in which they operate.  The storytelling process allows them to continue 
to do their jobs even when their funds underperform for an extended period of time. It equally 
serves to legitimate what they do both in their own eyes (self-legitimation) and in those of their 
investors and other third parties. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on sense-
making, legitimacy theory, narratives and stories. Section 3 describes the data used in the study, 
how it is collected and explores its validity. Section 4 relates and classifies the genres of story 
used by fund managers in their confidential interviews to maintain “belief” in, and legitimate 
what they do; and the following section brings parallel evidence of stories told by fund 
managers in their formal reports to investors. Finally, section 6 discusses our findings and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Sense-making and self-legitimation: the role of storytelling 
Storytelling is a versatile human activity that can be used to exert power, construct and defend 
identity, transfer knowledge, unfreeze boundaries, and engage in sense-making and sense-
destroying (Brown, Gabriel and Gherardi, 2009). The thesis of this paper is that by telling 
stories both to themselves and to others, fund managers construct their self-identity and are able 
to make sense of the uncertain and opaque world in which they operate.  Equally they are able 
to claim legitimacy for what they do.  
Sense-making is an integral part of the fund manager’s search for meaning. It is “fundamentally 
tied to processes of individual identity generation and maintenance” (Brown, Stacey and 
Nandhakumar, 2008).  
“Sensemaking is a search for plausibility and coherence that is reasonable 
and memorable, which embodies past experience and expectations, and 
maintains the self while resonating with others. It can be constructed 
retrospectively, yet used prospectively, and captures thoughts and 
emotions….[It] render[s] the subjective as something more tangible.” 
(Weick, 1995, p.14)  
Sense-making is the process by which we mould our own identity in an ambiguous world and 
“tell” ourselves who we are.  It is grounded in our constant struggle to construct our own 
identities and seek legitimacy (Maclean, Harvey and Chia, 2012). Whittle and Mueller (2012) 
further define sense-making as “the process through which people interpret themselves and the 
world around them through the production of meaning” – the key here is the linking of 
meaning with both the person and the world around them. 
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Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as:“…a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.”  Relatively little is known about the processes 
by which legitimacy is acquired, but the use of narrative is crucial at both organisational and 
individual levels (Maclean, Harvey and Chia, 2012).  Story-telling and sense-making processes 
are intimately related to modes of self-legitimation.  Most legitimacy research focuses on the 
nature of organisational legitimacy (e.g., Suchman, 1995: Tyler, 2006). However, here we are 
more concerned with how fund managers justify what they do. This is both to themselves as 
captured by the interview process, and to significant others such as their clients and employers 
in terms of their formal reports.
6
 We suggest that the manner in which asset managers report on 
their performance to their investors is equally part of the process by which they seek to make 
sense of the impenetrable world in which they are located.  This is as well as seeking to 
persuade their clients (and, importantly, themselves) that their funds are being well and 
competently managed.  
In this paper we argue that the way fund managers construct the cognitive schema they need to 
be able to do their job in the face of continued threats and reverses is by constructing narratives. 
Narrative constitutes “the basic organising principle of human cognition” (Brown, Stacey and 
Nandhakumar, 2008) and “the primary form by which human experience is made meaningful” 
(Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 1). Although many authors use the terms narrative and story 
synonymously, in line e.g., with Gabriel (2000), Boje (2001), Czarniawska (2004) and 
Maclean, Harvey and Chia (2012) we treat “story” here as a sub-genre of narrative. Narratives, 
broadly defined, are texts, spoken or written, that usually involve a sequence of actions and 
events in a chronological and generally logically consistent manner. They “involve temporal 
chains of interrelated events or actions, undertaken by characters” (Gabriel, 2008, p. 194). 
Narrative truth is fundamentally different from factual truth but nonetheless real in that 
narratives allow us to make sense of situations.  More broadly, in terms of the accepted rather 
than contested nature of financial markets, market participants also make sense of the 
environment in which they collectively operate through “jointly negotiated” narratives. 
Narratives carry the market’s “common-sensical stock of knowledge” (Brown, Stacey and 
Nandhakumar, 2008). 
In our process of abductive reasoning (Lukka and Modell, 2010), we draw directly on the 
empirically-derived understanding of the nature and characteristics of different story genres of 
Gabriel (2000) which is based on 130 interviews and more than 400 distinct narratives.  The 
study of the nature of story dates back to the Ancient Greeks. Genre studies in narratology has 
an extensive literature and a wide range of story taxonomies exist.  A typical example is 
Booker’s (2004) The Seven Basic Plots which classifies stories in literature through to modern 
times as belonging to one of more of the following types: “overcoming the monster”, “rags to 
riches”, “the quest”, “voyage and return”, “comedy”, “tragedy” and “rebirth”. In an attempt to 
help provide authenticity and plausibility to our research, in this study we follow the 
                                                          
6
 In this context, as Maclean, Harvey and Chia (2012) point out, the listener, i.e., the interviewer whose 
approval the interviewee seeks to enhance self-esteem, also has a direct role to play in legitimation 
dynamics as the necessary “fellow traveller” or “Other” required for sense-making. Also see Brown, 
Stacey and Nandhakumar (2008). 
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empirically-based typology of organisational stories of Gabriel (2000, pp. 59-86). This 
taxonomy has the closest ecological validity to the types of stories related by our fund 
managers both in their interviews and formal reports to investors. Gabriel (2000, p. 59) points 
out that inevitably all such typologies are imperfect. However, adopting such an analytical 
framework helps to establish important similarities and differences in the characteristics of 
stories told and leads to a far deeper understanding of the underlying sense-making process 
being attempted.   
Gabriel (2000, p.239) defines stories as: 
“…narratives with plots and characters, generating emotion in narrator and 
audience through a poetic elaboration of symbolic material... Story plots 
entail conflicts, predicaments, trials, coincidences and crises that call for 
choices, decisions, actions and interactions, whose actual outcomes are often 
at odds with the characters’ intentions and purposes.”  
The plot functions to transform a chronicle or sequence of events into a story knitting together 
the events so that we can recognise a deeper significance of an event in the light of other events 
(Gabriel, 2008, p. 195). Stories are powerful devices for managing meaning and thus, 
potentially, an essential part of the storyteller’s sense-making process. Through the medium of 
story, the unexpected can be transformed into the ‘expectable’, and the storyteller can feel, on 
one level, the unmanageable future is ‘manageable’ or ‘controllable’. Interestingly “…the truth 
of a story lies not in the facts, but in the meaning. If people believe a story, if the story grips 
them, whether events actually happened or not is irrelevant” (Gabriel, 2000, p.4). The key is its 
plausibility rather than its accuracy. Importantly, in stories unpredictability does not imply 
inexplicability. Narrative rationality, or sense-making, arises from people’s “inherent 
awareness of narrative probability, what constitutes a coherent story… and narrative fidelity, 
whether or not the stories they experience ring true…” (Fisher, 1987, p. 64). There is no 
requirement for them actually to be true! “Accuracy is nice but not necessary in sense-
making…what is necessary in sense-making is a good story.” (Weick, 1995, p. 131) 
 
Gabriel (2000, pp. 35-42) describes how meaning is generated in stories, inter alia, 
distinguishing between such rhetorical devices as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony 
and what he terms poetic implements (or tropes).
7
 Gabriel sees such poetic tropes as the 
“storyteller’s central interpretive devices”, as without them “no amount of symbolic, 
rhetorical, or narrative elaboration can be effective” (Gabriel, 2000, p. 36). Gabriel identifies 
eight such tropes which represent ways of making sense of specific parts of the narrative or 
making connections between different parts. These types of attribution are namely, attributions 
of motive, causal connections, responsibility, unity, fixed qualities, emotion, agency, and 
finally, attribution of providential significance, and are largely self-explanatory. As we will see 
in the next section, different genres of story employ different sets of poetic tropes.  
                                                          
7
 The term ‘poetics’ originates from the Greek poiesis meaning “to make” as in the sense in our storytelling 
context of creating something new from existing materials (Gabriel, 2000, p. 10). 
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We hypothesise in this paper that through the use of stories and the broader narratives of group 
sense-making, fund managers are able to engage in a process of identity construction.
8
 Identity 
matters because it plays a key role in sense-making and tells us who we are and how we relate 
to others and the world (Gendron and Spira, 2010).  An essential part of how asset managers 
build their own desired self-image, and confirm their belief in the rationale of their investment 
process and thus personal legitimacy is conditioned on prior investment outcomes. If 
investment performance is perceived as favourable i.e., the fund has outperformed its 
benchmark or competing funds, the manager takes credit for his investment strategies and 
(consciously or unconsciously) seeks to portray himself as the hero of an epic-like investment 
story. However, if things go wrong, the manager typically attempts to explain why the strategy 
is still right but external factors wrong-footed the underlying investment process, and in doing 
so he depicts himself often as the unfair or undeserving victim of a tragic investment story.  
 
3. Data and method 
We draw on two distinct sets of narratives in this study: transcripts of depth interviews with 50 
equity fund managers (39 conventional stock pickers and 11 quantitative investment managers), 
and 50 randomly selected fund manager reports filed with the SEC. The research interviews 
were conducted with senior fund managers in Boston, Edinburgh, London, Paris, New York 
and Singapore and took place in the first 8 months of 2007. Full details of the interview process 
and nature of respondents are provided in Tuckett and Taffler (2012,  pp. 9-15). Most of the 
respondents managed over $1bn of assets with mean fund size of almost $10bn. On average 
they had 15 years of portfolio management experience and controlled a wide range of funds 
investing across most developed and developing markets. Given the way in which respondents 
were selected and their tenure in their jobs two-thirds had outperformed their benchmarks over 
the previous three years and, as such, interviews may have been biased towards more 
successful managers. However, as we will show, the key role storytelling plays in the fund 
manager sense-making and self-legitimation process appears independent of actual fund 
performance, although the types of stories told will differ.    
Interviews were 70 minutes long on average, and all conducted by the same highly experienced 
research interviewer. Each interview was tape-recorded and carefully transcribed to produce 
narratives capable of systematic qualitative analysis. The format used in the interviews was the 
standardised non-schedule interview (SNSI) developed by social epidemiologists specifically to 
deal with the social meaning problem (e.g., Richardson, Dohrenwend and Klein, 1965), a 
variant of the conventional qualitative interview (Gaskell, 2000). In an SNSI, respondents talk 
freely and explore how they understand the questions with the interviewer, who essentially 
plays the role of a “sounding board”, responding and probing to get underneath the assumptions 
                                                          
8
 Fund managers are also tied together within the general organisational narratives of the market and their 
investment houses which Tuckett and Taffler (2012, p. 52) drawing on Lyotard (1979) term their ‘meta-
narratives’.  Lyotard argues that such grands recits are used to legitimate power, authority and social customs 
and are designed, on one level, to help people feel better that there is some order in the world.  The post-
modernist movement, which emphasises the relativity of all activity, has tended to shatter such underlying 
beliefs. 
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respondents make about what the interviewer means or wants to know, and deliberate or non-
deliberate attempts to mislead.  Tuckett and Taffler (2012, pp. 20-22) discuss validity issues in 
detail. Although the interviews explored a wide range of issues, an important part of each 
interview was concerned with specific investment decisions made in the previous 12 months 
where respondents were most satisfied or dissatisfied, and why they worked out or did not work 
out. Analysis of the these parts of the interview data provides the focus of the next section of 
this paper.
9
     
Our second set of narratives is drawn from the annual reports of mutual fund managers to their 
investors on their funds’ performance and is randomly sampled from public filings in the SEC 
Edgar database. We were not able to use formal reports to investors written by our interviewed 
fund managers for confidentiality reasons, as this would disclose the identity of our 
interviewees. We select a 2% random sample from the approximately 2,500 mutual fund annual 
reports filed relating to fund performance in 2007 for formal narrative analysis to match our 
sample of interviews  in  number and time period. Although these funds are all registered in the 
US, only about half of them invest primarily in stocks listed on the main US exchanges with the 
remainder investing globally or in European, Asian or developing markets etc., a similar spread 
of fund types as with our interview respondents. 
Mutual fund annual reports filed with the SEC typically consists of several parts.  However, 
since the focus of our paper is on fund manager sense-making and self-legitimation, and 
individual managers are responsible for their fund’s investment decisions, the sections in which 
they report on their funds’ prior year performance are the relevant narratives for purposes of 
analysis.  
Not all formal fund manager reports contain stories, however. Some are purely factual and 
mostly concerned with reporting sector and stock performance. Such narratives that provide 
descriptive accounts of events and emphasise “factual accuracy rather than narrative effect” 
(Gabriel, 2000, p. 146) are better classified as “reports” or “descriptions”. We also find many 
examples of proto-stories which contain “the seed of a story without achieving the poetic 
imagination and narrative complexity that would make them proper stories” i.e., terse 
narratives with very thin plot (Gabriel, 2000, p. 60). This may not be surprising given the fact 
that mutual funds have to file these official and formal disclosure documents with the 
regulators. In this paper, we distinguish between descriptions that deal with facts-as-
information, and stories that deal with facts-as-experience for both the narrators and the 
audience. While in the former, the chronicler is committed to accuracy; in the latter, the 
storyteller is committed to effect (Jameson, 2000). 
The issue of the authorship of fund manager commentaries in mutual fund annual reports is 
important for the purposes of our study. The normal practice in the asset management industry 
is that fund managers write their own reports. These may then be edited by in-house writers to 
check correct use of language and ensure presentational consistency with other sections of the 
annual report. In other words, in-house editors are less concerned with the core themes, 
                                                          
9
 The interview schedule is available at www.palgrave.com/finance/mindingthemarkets/interviews/2-2007-
Interview-Schedule.pdf. 
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structure and rhetoric of the underlying narratives which are typically authored by, and the 
prerogatives of, the asset managers themselves. In addition, fund managers, like CEOs, are 
signatories of their reports and assume legal responsibility for their contents. This acts as an 
incentive for them to scrutinise closely and approve the final version of the narrative prior to 
signature and publication. More importantly, the words in the fund manager’s letters to 
investors are symbolic and emblematic, and the reader takes them to be their own.  
The question of authorship can be further examined empirically by investigating variations 
between individual fund manager reports originating from the same investment house. If the 
content and style of a fund manager’s commentary is significantly influenced by the overarching 
investment philosophy of the investment house or its in-house editors, narratives should appear 
largely homogeneous regardless of who the fund manager is. However, inspection showed this 
was certainly not the case in our sample. In fact, to explore this issue more formally we 
examined 50 other fund manager letters randomly selected across five investment houses and 
conducted cross-comparisons. Using a range of Diction content analysis software variables 
(Hart, 1984, 2001), as well as narrative readability and tone measures (Henry, 2008), we found a 
high level of within-sample variation directly attributable to the individual fund managers. We 
thus conclude it is appropriate to treat our formal fund manager reports as originating directly 
from the fund managers and being independently authored by them. 
In our study, we specifically focus on the genres and plots of the stories our fund managers 
relate. In principle, story content may be a product of fantasy or experience. The plot functions 
to transform a chronicle or sequence of events into a story - knitting them together so that we 
can recognise their deeper significance and interconnectedness and why they occur (Gabriel, 
2008, pp. 282-284). In this way, a sense of purpose is typically attributed to particular events 
even if these might otherwise be seen as unpredictable or accidental. Gabriel (2000) identifies 
four generic types of story: epic, tragic, comic and romantic. We will frequently refer to these 
genres in our analysis of fund manager narratives. 
Epic stories have a plot that focuses on a significant achievement, a noble victory or success in a 
contest, challenge or trial. Such stories are designed to generate a feeling of pride in the narrator 
and admiration (and even envy) in the reader/listener for the protagonist or “hero”. They almost 
always have a happy ending. Many of the stories our fund managers narrate about their 
investments that worked out are of this nature. Tragic stories, on the other hand, generate 
emotions of pity or sorrow, leading to respect and compassion for the “undeserving victim” with 
the plot built around the undeserved outcome, often with a “villain” present (such as the market 
or company management). Many of the stories our respondents narrate about investments that 
did not work out are of this nature. Comic stories generate laughter, amusement and levity with 
themes that might be mishaps, communication breakdowns, confusion or more generally the 
unexpected, with the plot focus being misfortune or deserved chastisement. Romantic stories, 
finally, have a lighter sentimental quality and evoke such feelings as love, gratitude and 
appreciation. Their plots tend to focus on “love triumphant” or misfortune conquered by love.  
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of all the four main story genres. The listed genres are 
quite distinct in their plots and characteristic attributes. However, they can also merge to 
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produce hybrid genres such as tragi-comic and tragi-epic. In our analysis of stories fund 
managers narrate in both their interviews and formal reports, we focus on the main (dominant) 
story types and, in particular, epic and tragic story types, the most common ones.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Following Gabriel (2000) we were able clearly to identify 172 distinct stories being told about 
their investments by our fund manager interviewees, an average of almost 3.5 per respondent, 
but only 53, or just over one on average in our formal fund manager reports.  However,  this 
difference is not surprising. There is a much larger proportion of factual, plotless or thinly 
plotted (proto-story) narratives in our mutual fund reports and our fund manager commentaries 
reflect the fact they are embedded in official disclosure documents filed with regulatory bodies. 
By contrast, our depth interviews provided a natural and confidential setting in which 
respondents could freely discuss their investment decisions, and thus provide a much richer set 
of stories for analytical purposes. Nonetheless, both sets of narratives clearly demonstrate that 
fund managers actively engage in storytelling to themselves and others in their attempt at 
sense-making and establishing legitimacy.  
Table 2 classifies each set of stories to one of our four main genres in line with the story types 
of table 1.  As can be seen, epic  and tragic stories dominate in both our interviews and formal 
reports, accounting for 3 in 4 of our interview-derived stories (130/172) and 46 out of 53 in our 
fund manager published commentaries.  Perhaps, not surprisingly, there are more epic stories 
than tragic ones although the differences are not statistically different in either case.  However, 
more interestingly, a chi-square test of differences in story type distributions between our 
interviews and mutual fund reports is not significant.  On this basis, we have no evidence that 
fund managers tell different types of story to third parties than they are, in effect, relating to 
themselves. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 suggests fund managers rely predominantly on stories of an epic and a tragic nature to 
make sense of the unpredictable environment in which they operate. As we will see, when their 
investment strategies work out, typically they view themselves as the hero, and when things do 
not, they tend to take on the mantle of the (non-deserving) victim.  Because of their prominence 
we concentrate on these two story types in our empirical analysis in the next two sections of the 
paper. In particular, we provide representative examples of the stories we encountered in both 
sets of investment narratives and the relevant poetic tropes to illustrate how storytelling is an 
integral part of how fund managers make sense of their work and seek self-legitimacy.  
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4. Investment stories and sense-making: evidence from interviews 
In this section, we analyse the sample of fund manager interview transcripts introduced earlier. 
The interviewed fund managers all operate in a highly competitive and emotionally demanding 
environment where they are required to generate exceptional investment performance both in 
the short and longer term, as well as to find ways of dealing with the range of conflicting 
demands placed on them. Their investment decisions are only loosely related to subsequent 
outcomes, and thus, in doing their jobs in such a complex and often unpredictable environment, 
they often enter into relationships with their investments despite the fact that they can easily let 
them down. We describe how fund managers deal with the key requirements of their tasks, not 
so much by arrogance or overconfidence as could be supposed, but by making sense of what 
they do and gaining self-belief through telling stories.  
Of course, this is not to suggest that the interviewed fund managers settle for any ordinary and 
perhaps irrational story. The stories fund managers narrate are about the things that happen to 
other investors, companies, countries, economies, resources, innovations and long-run 
fundamentals, among other topics (Tuckett and Taffler, 2012). In fact, their stories may not even 
be classified as narratives, rather they more closely fit the definition of antenarrative as 
explained in Boje (2001: 1-5). While the classic definition of narrative brings to mind a linear, 
coherent and ordered tale told by a single author(ity) (ibid), the antenarrative, on the other hand, 
“captures the ‘lived experience’ of storytelling in organisations where stories often have 
multiple authors (plurivocality), get built up in piecemeal fashion over time, often recounted 
only in fragments, never completely finalised and always open to new ‘twists’ as they are re-
told” (Whittle and Mueller, 2012). 
What is interesting is that given the environment in which fund managers have to work, their 
investment stories have to be continually replenished with new ones of investment successes, so 
that a manager’s confidence in his or her particular “skills” is continuously reinforced. In section 
4.1, we provide examples and discuss in more detail the role of epic stories in maintaining self-
belief and pride among fund managers. In section 4.2, we conduct a similar analysis for tragic 
stories.  
4.1. Investment successes: epic stories told in interviews 
The epic stories fund managers narrate about their successful investments play a key role in their 
ability to generate the confidence they require to make daily investment decisions in otherwise 
chaotic, ambiguous and highly unpredictable situations. Let us start with one of our 
interviewees, George Monroe (pseudonym), who manages a $15 billion global value fund. This 
is how, in his own words, he invested in the US restaurant chain Fast Foods (pseudonym). 
And they had a meeting at their headquarters with the CFO.... And so I went, I talked with them, 
and, and, and I said, oh my goodness, I think I like what I’m hearing…  But I said, I actually believe 
him, I believe him, and, and so I just came back and I started pushing. I was looking at the balance 
sheet, I started pushing the numbers, went over conference call transcripts from the prior two 
conference calls… So we bought it, it was great, all of those things sort of played out… we’re 
probably a year and a half into it. It is coming up to probably 50%, and they are continuing to 
execute just incredibly well. I think this next quarter is going to be humongous. 
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The way George explains his investment in Fast Foods above is essentially telling a story with a 
specific beginning, middle and end. There is an initial trigger based on curiosity and a plot about 
an undervalued business that he manages uniquely to identify through his detailed analysis (the 
market is wrong) and then a successful outcome - a price increase of 50%, with more still to 
follow. The plot he constructs allows George to make sense of what he did and his investment 
success. He experiences pride in his competence and abilities and also provides meaning to 
himself that analysis of this nature can identify situations that others miss. At a deeper level, 
George feels that the uncertain and unpredictable world he operates in can be “managed” in this 
way, and there is an underlying pattern and sense in what he does. Of course, the same 
information he drew on was equally available to the other fund managers at the same investment 
meeting. Presumably they interpreted this in different ways and came up with different stories 
and associated investment decisions. In fact, George even wondered in his interview why 
everyone did not leave the meeting at Fast Foods’ headquarters with the same idea he had and 
buy the stock—actually worrying there would be no investment opportunity open for him. We 
can see how his ability to tell a credible story to himself gave him the necessary belief to enter 
into a relationship with Fast Foods (i.e. buy its stock). 
George Monroe was not alone, however, in doing this. Most of the interviewed fund managers, 
whether traditional stock-pickers or quant managers, seemed to engage equally in storytelling 
when explaining how they made investment decisions. In fact, fund managers used the term 
“story” to introduce or describe their investment decisions, both those which were successful 
and those that disappointed them, no less than 151 times; and “stories”, usually in reference to a 
number of these, which were then elaborated on, a further 20 times. On average the term was 
used more than three times in each interview. It seems our fund managers were well aware of 
the crucial role storytelling plays in helping them make sense of their investment task and 
maintain their belief in their ability to generate alpha in the face of the demanding and hostile 
environment in which they had to operate. 
Returning to George Monroe’s explanation for the success of his investment in Fast Foods, we 
can see how the story he relates is in the epic genre, with him playing the role of narrator or 
protagonist but also hero. Deconstructing the story metaphorically, the plot focus is built around 
how George wins a noble victory in his implicit contest with other fund managers in the quest of 
identifying undervalued stocks, which he does in a courageous way through the agency of 
rigorous financial analysis. The story inspires emotions of pride (in the narrator) and also 
admiration (in the interviewer proxying for colleagues, superiors and clients). Importantly, the 
excited emotions the success of George Monroe’s investment evokes - up 50% and an expected 
“humungous next quarter” - serve to reinforce his confidence in the value of his investment 
approach more generally, quite apart from justifying his belief to invest in Fast Foods in the first 
place. Other tropes employed by George Monroe in his story include (1) attribution of motive, 
e.g., “they [the management] really try and focus on managing their business”, (2) attribution of 
causal connection, e.g., getting risk out of the business model, (3) attribution of responsibility in 
terms of credit, i.e., to George Monroe who managed heroically, “I started pushing the 
numbers”, and (4) attribution of emotion, “other people don’t get so excited about… taking risk 
away”, unlike him. 
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The Fast Foods story also shares some features of the romantic genre (though not dominantly)  
with the business itself being the love object and George Monroe being seemingly and 
somewhat embarrassedly infatuated with his investment. In fact, in a further passage, he became 
so enthusiastic that he got spontaneously quite carried away in his narrative: 
I go into their restaurants all the time, I stand there and I watch, I’m like asking myself, what are people 
ordering? I was in there this morning, so, I swear to God, I was in their restaurant this morning … I 
have a couple of things … Oh, it’s so gross, I was in there last night too, I got something on the train 
from it. They have an incredible amount of new products, and I stand there and I watch them and I see 
who’s ordering what … I’ve been in so many of these restaurants over the past month I knew these 
sales numbers were going to be great because I’ve been like counting how many of these things are on 
the counter when I’m in there. So it turns out one of the products that I saw over and over they even ran 
out of … I’m not afraid to get into the trenches also and stand in a restaurant and see what they order. 
[And he concludes] So, I don’t know, that worked out well, that’s why it sort of worked out well. 
Here the plot relates to how the narrator’s love for Fast Foods leads to the recognition of a 
special insight and understanding. Through the attribution of emotion, George Monroe’s 
infatuation with Fast Food makes it meaningful as a perfect investment in his eyes and this is 
communicated to his audience. Other tropes used to enhance his story include attribution of 
credit with Fast Foods as a worthy “love object” ,and attribution of motive, i.e., observing what 
people are ordering in restaurants as a predictor of group-wide sales numbers.
10
 
Another example of the epic investment story could come from Mark Devreaux (pseudonym), 
who leads a large team running a group of value-based mutual funds and is responsible for 
investing $35 billion largely, but not exclusively, in the United States. His strategy is built 
around finding companies with low valuations that he judges to have considerable upside 
potential. He is also prepared to invest in distressed situations: “We’re striving for steady, 
consistent, long-term returns… what makes for a good value investor is being able to, sort of, 
separate out the emotion.” 
Mark described three investments with which he felt satisfied. He used his successful 
investment in Car to illustrate to the interviewer (and implicitly, to himself) how well his 
investment process works. In this case, slightly more than a year before the interview, the news 
about the company was extremely negative, with one of its biggest suppliers seemingly at risk of 
bankruptcy: 
We kicked the tyres, did a lot of work. Kicked the tyres literally, figuratively, whatever and took a 
stake in Car. And the surprising part was the stock ran up very quickly… in a relatively short period 
of time, and hit our price target level very quickly, and then we made a decision to exit the stock at 
that point. We revisited it when there were another series of development in a large shareholder 
exited the stock; the stock came under a lot of pressure. Again, another flow of negative news, and 
we made a decision to re-enter… which again, you know, was somewhat controversial. And the 
stock had, you know, a nice rebound. We still own it… 
 
                                                          
10
 This story may also contain dimensions of a third hybrid genre, the epic-comic story with the hero, George 
Monroe, using irony and self-insight to explain his understanding of the business, e.g., “I’m not afraid to get 
into the trenches … and see what they order.” 
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Mark’s story is in characteristic epic mode, with the hero achieving significant success in 
terms of the challenge of dealing with a high-risk investment that is difficult to evaluate. He 
believed other investment houses had missed out on the opportunity because they had neither 
the same courage to take on the challenge nor, presumably, the same analytical abilities as his 
house has. Mark uses a range of poetic tropes to help generate emotional engagement in the 
story. These include attribution of the agency of his investment process, attribution of credit 
to him (and his team) for getting it right, and attribution of the fixed qualities of courage, 
industry, and coolness in the face of a complex and uncertain situation. His story evokes the 
emotions of pride in the teller and, implicitly, admiration in the listener and himself. The 
successful outcome also seems to provide reassurance to him that his investment process 
works, so he can safely continue to engage in relationships with such high-risk stocks. Also, 
in his storytelling, Mark appeared quietly satisfied with how his analysis had pushed out the 
emotion inherent in such an uncertain investment. His comment ‘it was not easy going 
against consensus sentiment’ suggests to him that they had a competitive advantage over 
others in line with his meta-narrative. 
4.2. Investment failures: tragic stories told in interviews 
When investments do not work out favourably, a common phenomenon in financial markets, 
fund managers often use stories in a tragic mode to make sense of what has happened, and to 
convey this sense to their clients. In our sample of interview narratives, there were a large 
number of stories narrated in a tragic genre usually in response to the request for examples 
where things did not work out as hoped. For example, George Monroe told one such story, My 
Utility. It was a business whose management team he clearly considered to have exceptional 
ability. Although they made acquisitions, cut costs and managed to make these work, their stock 
was underpriced: 
There was a valuation discrepancy between this company and most of its peers … [but] “that multiple 
disparity would eventually close”… Apparently everything went as planned, although the multiple 
never really closed. However, the two most senior people left “in the span of a three-month 
timeframe, I’ve never seen anything like that in my career.” Both had left for better jobs and their loss 
was considered a big risk, “It’s a fault of the board … I don’t at all subscribe to the notion that it’s just 
sort of bad luck for the company”.  
George thought very definitely that the board should have prevented it from happening, “you 
love this management team, you thought they would do exactly the right thing for you, you 
thought they would extract this value … but the two most senior people are both gone.” 
George’s My Utility story is clearly in a tragic genre with him as protagonist in the role of 
undeserving victim. The two executives who let him down play the roles of villains with the 
other characters - the board, which should not have let these two top executives leave for other 
jobs - being at best negligent, even if not implicitly colluding in his loss. The plot focus can be 
described as one of undeserved misfortune with some of the detailed attributions employed in 
his story generating underlying explanatory meanings by suggesting motives - it was almost as 
if he felt the managers left to thwart him, by allocating responsibility - blaming the board, and 
of providential significance, in this case malevolent fate. Emotions of sorrow, anger and pathos 
are clearly engendered in the telling of the story in both the narrator and the listener. 
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Interestingly, it may be overlooked that his thesis was not working out as he expected before 
the departure of the executives, with valuation multiples not aligning with those of equivalent 
firms.  
When asked to remember investments that failed, our fund managers provided further examples 
of tragic stories, as well as stories in hybrid genres such as tragi-comic. In terms of plot, these 
stories were very similar to George’s My Utility story. Table 3 lists the main context-specific 
elements of stories told in the epic and tragic genres and reports numbers of stories in each case.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
 
5. Investment stories and sense-making in formal reports 
 
In this section, we demonstrate further evidence to support the storytelling hypothesis based 
on our set of formal fund manager reports. To test whether storytelling is as omnipresent as a 
process of sense-making when fund managers also address an external audience, we explore 
the content of their reports to investors. Should we find that similar stories and rhetorical 
tropes are used in formal reports, we will have further evidence that stories are a key way in 
which market participants make sense of their inherently unpredictable and anxiety-
generating investment tasks. However, it is important to remember that the narratives we 
analyse in this section are official disclosure documents, and are thus expected to be more 
formal in their tone and structure than interview transcripts. As we will notice, these 
investment reports are nevertheless embedded with generally similar investment stories 
although one also comes across many instances of purely factual reports and proto-stories. 
We categorise the narratives in a similar way using the two common genres of epic and tragic 
stories.   
 
5.1. Investment successes: epic stories in formal reports 
About half of the stories we come across in reading fund manager reports are of the epic 
genre. These narratives display most of the features associated with epic stories in Table 1. In 
particular, the narrators of epic investment stories often attribute positive investment 
performance, explicitly or implicitly, to their stock-picking skills and downplay or ignore the 
role of favourable conditions in their macro-environment. Not surprisingly, epic stories are 
most common among funds that have outperformed their (often self-designated) benchmarks 
in their reporting period. For example, the narrative below is part of the fund manager 
commentary of a $3.1bn large-cap fund (by the name of Madison Mosaic Disciplined Equity) 
which claims to “seek long-term growth with diversification among all equity market 
sectors.” The fund has managed to outperform its benchmark in the fiscal year prior to the 
report. We have added italics for emphasis: 
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Against the fund’s benchmark S&P 500’s return of 26.46%, Disciplined Equity rewarded investors 
with a strong 32.50% gain. This was also ahead of its Lipper peer group, as the Lipper Large Cap 
Core Index rose 28.15%. With our portfolio currently allocated across S&P 500 sectors, the 
positive results against the S&P 500 and the Lipper Index were largely a function of our stock 
selection... Our goal is to own the highest quality companies we can in each sector of the market, a 
judgment made on an array of business metrics that boil down to a combination of attractive 
valuation and the ability to produce consistent, predictable earnings going forward… The market 
slump in the first quarter of the year did trouble us to some extent [but] the strength of our stock 
picking was evident in our outperformance in all ten S&P 500 sectors... With strong sector by 
sector performance, our only weak spots were a handful of companies that underperformed over 
our course of ownership. 
The protagonist of this story is the fund’s management team (or fund manager) who 
supposedly delivered superior returns relative to their self-designated benchmark. The story 
can be characterised as being in the epic genre with the protagonist as hero. Inter alia, the 
plot revolves around the market slump in the first quarter which constitutes a challenge or 
trial, despite which the fund manager is able to outperform her benchmark, or achieve 
success or, implicitly, a noble victory through the agency of her ability and skill. What is 
communicated to the reader is the emotion of pride and implicitly an expectation of 
admiration for the achievement. The reference to “our only weak spots” adds a touch of 
humility to the story in the end. 
As another example of an epic story, let us look at the fund manager commentary of a $885m 
large-cap fund (by the name of Bridgeway Aggressive Investors 2) in 2007: 
Our Fund bounced back strongly in the June quarter, outperforming all our market and peer 
benchmarks. Aggressive Investors 2 increased by an impressive 11.61%, trouncing our primary market 
index (the S&P 500 Index - down 2.73...) We are quite pleased with our selection of the Fund’s 
positions which outperformed all of its benchmarks for the full fiscal year on both an absolute and 
relative return basis... The Fund suffered to some extent from exposure to financials although we 
managed to close some weak positions early on… While we welcome such strong results during these 
shorter-term quarterly and twelve month time horizons, our strategies stay constant and consistent in 
both good times and bad, in both strong and weak markets, during both “the sky is the limit” and “the 
sky is falling” investor environments.  
 
In this epic story, the protagonist can be viewed as the fund itself and its managers implicitly, 
who manage to heavily defeat (“trounce”) their benchmarks. The narrator is clearly very 
pleased with the fund’s investment performance and its positions (selected through the 
agency of the managers’ stock-picking skills) that resulted in outperforming its benchmarks. 
The managers were able to close down some weak positions exposing them to the financial 
sector (the challenge) supposedly early on although the Fund incurred some losses because of 
this. Once again, an implicit expectation of admiration is communicated to the reader for this 
achievement. The fund manager later goes on to explain that most of the Fund’s top 
performers during the fiscal year were chemical-related stocks, and that they correctly 
anticipated the rising affluence of the population in many emerging markets and thus the 
demand for different foods and other materials, another good “judgment call” from the 
managers. 
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Telling a story in the epic genre can provide an opportunity for conveying the legitimacy of 
the narrator/protagonist. For example, towards the end of the same commentary above, the 
fund manager takes on the mantle of a wise teacher and strongly admonishes investors for 
trying to time the market, showing strong emotions in the process: 
We consistently encourage our investors not to “chase hot returns”… One of the saddest things we see 
some of our shareholders do is appropriately pick a given Bridgeway fund to meet their investment 
objectives, but to time the entry and exit of our funds so as to “destroy value” by buying after a market 
and/or fund run-up, and selling after a decline. This drives us nuts. 
 
This and many other examples can suggest that emotions are communicated by fund 
managers even in their formal reports despite their role as official disclosures. In the 
following sub-section, we provide similar evidence based on tragic stories embedded in fund 
manager commentaries.   
 
5.2. Investment failures: tragic stories in formal reports 
In reading fund manager reports, we have come across a similarly large number of narratives 
that can be categorised as tragic stories and constitute more than a third of all the stories 
embedded in our formal reports. We find that tragic stories are more common among funds 
that have underperformed their benchmarks in the reporting year.
11
 In constructing their 
plots, narrators often downplay, consciously or unconsciously, any reference to excessive 
risk-taking, poor stock-selection, weighting and timing decisions on their part. For example, 
note how the manager of a $7.5bn value fund (by the name of Artisan International Value 
Fund) seeks to explain the fund’s underperformance relative to benchmark in the following 
commentary: 
The most noticeable aspect of the equity markets during the second and third quarters was the 
absence of investor conviction. Trading volumes were low, held down by both the normal summer 
trading doldrums and by the high level of economic and geopolitical uncertainty... The earnings of 
small companies are particularly vulnerable to shifts in economic conditions, and small-cap stock 
prices have historically reflected this vulnerability. Small caps were strong toward the end of 
previous year, and they became weak when investor sentiment changed. The July decline of growth 
stocks was particularly marked in the small-cap market. Despite a September surge by small-cap 
Internet stocks, the Russell 2500 Index (a broad small-cap index) was still negative at period-end. 
In the above commentary, the fund manager portrays herself as the undeserving victim and 
focusses on the numerous challenges she has had to face in that year. Lack of investor 
conviction, the uncertainty in the environment and the “summer trading doldrums” all qualify 
for implicit villains of this story.  
 
                                                          
11
 Such narratives, particularly when absolute performance is positive, are relatively complex in structure. 
Jameson (2000) finds that similar narratives from her sample typically employ a nonlinear structure, contrast 
narrators to dramatise ideas, and embed various sub-genres such that readers are led to participate in 
constructing the investment story. 
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We also observed that the narrators of tragic investment stories often use indirect or implicit 
mentions of challenges, performance detractors, etc. presumably to soften the blow to their 
readers. Instead of simple and clear phrases such as “underperformance” and “poor 
performance”, one comes across various euphemisms  such as: the fund faced a few clunkers, 
we had only a blemish on performance, our stock selection left something to be desired, the 
fund was caught up in some investments we rather like to forget, the fund experienced a slight 
headwind, the fund absorbed an opportunity cost, the fund is entering a catch up period, etc. 
Such euphemisms and metaphors in explaining poor performance may be used, consciously 
or unconsciously, to confound or obfuscate the underlying bad news.  
The following excerpt is part of the fund manager commentary of a fund by the name of 
Stratton Multi-cap Fund which had $995m of investments in 2007. The fund heavily 
underperformed its benchmark and its own average annual return during the reporting period 
of 2007. 
The performance of the Fund was disappointing. Our total return was less than 1%, compared to an 
average annual return of 12.4% over the past 30 years… we believe it was our overweighting in Energy 
and Business Cycle sensitive stocks that dragged our performance down… These stocks have been hurt 
by an unusually warm winter that lasted through early January. We believe that weather conditions 
always return to normal; when that happens it should be reflected in higher oil and natural gas prices 
resulting in higher prices of the underlying Energy equities. I want to assure our investors that 
management of the Fund is disappointed with the results and deeply committed to making the portfolio 
changes necessary to return the performance to a level more indicative of the long-term rates of return 
that the Fund has generated for its shareholders over 34 years. 
Energy stocks (which underperformed due to an unusually warm winter by malevolent fate) 
are blamed as villains of this tragic investment story while the fund and its managers as well 
as its investors are implicitly portrayed as undeserving victims. The fund has lost in the quest 
against its peers as well as its own track record. The narrator is quick to point out his 
disappointment with the investment results. This may serve to generate a feeling of pathos in 
the readers which is a characteristic feature of tragic stories, see Table 1. 
In the following tragic story, the fund manager is faced with the problem of justifying 
underperformance relative to benchmark. She avoids having to explain the fund’s 
underperformance by engaging in a dichotomy between the fund’s prior one-year and the 
prior three-year returns. 
 
For the twelve months ending September 30th 2006, the Growth & Income Fund was up 5.40%. 
This was below the S&P 500 Index which was up 10.79%. Although the return for the last year was 
below average, a review of the last three years shows the Growth & Income Fund to be competitive, 
up an average of 11.26% per year… It is always a tug-of-war in the securities markets with the 
negative forces of geopolitical events, natural disasters and corporate corruption pushing securities 
down… The good news is that in the long run, the positives have prevailed... Our investment story 
has been, and continues to be, that the negatives are more than offset by a strong US economy and 
record corporate profits. Our optimistic investment outlook goes beyond the US border. 
The villains of the story are again the uncontrollable market forces which one can always 
blame for anything that has gone wrong. The fund manager also employs the “fighting” 
metaphor to stress the role of external factors. Towards the end, the fund manager takes on 
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the mantle of a teacher explaining to the reader how securities markets generally operate, 
prior to ending the narrative with a somewhat prophetic note of optimism. 
 
 [Table 4 here] 
 
6. Discussion 
This paper studies a wide range of fund manager stories told through both interviews and 
formal reports to investors.  In it we demonstrate how fund managers engage in storytelling to 
help construct their identity, seek to justify their added value, despite lack of formal evidence 
they can outperform other fund managers or their benchmarks on any consistent basis, and 
make sense of an unpredictable and opaque market environment. Storytelling is an indelible 
part of the fund managers’ search for meaning and self-legitimacy.  
We show that a common set of unifying themes motivates the stories that fund managers 
narrate both in their interview narratives as well as their published commentaries on their 
investment performance. Depending on investment outcome, consciously or unconsciously, 
fund managers choose the story genre and elements of the plot, the protagonist and associated 
characters, and the poetic tropes that together are designed to generate the desired emotional 
response in themselves as narrator and the interviewer/report reader.  Such a process allows 
fund managers to provide seemingly plausible explanations for their investment performance, 
particularly when not looked at too closely, both to themselves as well as their clients and 
employers, and maintain self-belief in the value of what they do. 
Most of the stories fund managers related about their investment successes were in the epic 
genre with themselves as heroes in the quest of earning superior returns for their clients in 
competition with other asset managers against the backdrop of a threatening market 
environment. We also explored the stories they told about situations they had hoped would 
work out but did not. In such cases, the typical plot took on the guise of the tragic story genre. 
As Tuckett and Taffler (2012, p.67) explain, a significant feature of investment failures is that 
because of the way fund managers are able to explain (away) such  outcomes with plausible 
stories, they do not appear “to threaten their meta-narratives or underlying investment credo.” 
Instead, what is reinforced is their raison d’être or their ontological security as Giddens (1990) 
points out. Storytelling, in this sense, is a versatile way of explaining undesirable outcomes 
without threatening underlying beliefs. 
Importantly, in stories, unpredictability does not imply inexplicability. Fund managers’ stories 
clearly play a key role in providing the necessary meaning to them in what they do, even when 
there is no formal means of proving or disproving their underlying investment theses. “[T]he 
truth of a story lies not in the facts, but in the meaning” according to Gabriel (2000, p.4), 
because “if people believe a story, if the story grips them, whether events actually happened or 
not is irrelevant.” The key selling point of the story is its plausibility and coherence rather than 
accuracy. 
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As we have pointed out storytelling and associated sense-making processes are directly related 
to self-legitimisation.  Fund managers need to be able to demonstrate to themselves as well as 
their clients and investment houses their actions are “desirable, proper or appropriate” 
(Suchman, 1995). Suchman argues that legitimacy is socially constructed and leads to 
continuing support, increased trust  (they “ have our best interests at heart”) and influence.  
Legitimacy also submerges the possibility of dissent, i.e., in our case that fund managers may 
not, in fact, add value, “for things to be otherwise is literally unthinkable”. Storytelling is a 
very effective way to do this. 
Particularly interesting are the parallels with the life history interview-based study of Maclean, 
Harvey and Chia (2012) into the way business leaders use storytelling as the vehicle to make 
sense of and thereby legitimise what they do.  These authors suggest that legitimacy largely 
concerns external validation.  However, our research suggests that an integral part of what fund 
managers are doing in the stories they tell themselves and others is a search for self-legitimacy. 
They have to justify what they do when they “know” what is required of them, which is to 
generate “alpha” for their clients on a consistent basis is, at best, very difficult if not impossible 
to do. 
Maclean, Harvey and Chia (2012) identify four broad thematic modes of legitimisation in their 
16 separate interviews: “defying-the-odds” (triumphing despite adversity); “staying-the-course” 
(persevering over the years); “succeeding through talent” (earning success  through skill and 
application); and “giving back to society” (sharing success with others).  Interestingly, there are 
direct parallels in the self-legitimisation processes of our fund managers, although in the case 
of giving back to society we have less direct evidence in our interviews and formal reports.  
What there is has more to do with the implicit social value fund managers perceive they 
provide in helping clients meet their financial goals for different purposes (need examples 
here). 
 
Brown, Stacey and Nandhakumar (2008) argue more generally that sense-making can also be 
analysed using notions of impression management and attributional egotism.  The former 
refers to the self-presentation behaviours individuals employ to influence the perceptions 
others have of them, and the latter to the tendency of people to attribute favourable outcomes 
to their own actions and unfavourable outcomes to external factors. We certainly observe 
behaviours in our interviews and formal reports that can be described in these terms, 
particularly in the way epic- and tragic-type stories are employed. However, fund manager 
processes of identity generation, sense-making and attempts at self-legitimation are more 
subtle and less conscious than conventionally viewed. Both activities, if deliberate, in fact, 
imply a degree of guile and cynicism that is very unlikely to be common in practice. Rather, 
it is the power of the storytelling process to manage meaning that plays a key role, not simple 
explanations of the perceived reasons for out- or undeperformance.  As we have pointed out 
our fund manager interviewees were uniformly able and hard-working professionals, 
dedicated to what they were doing and seeking to act in the best interests of their clients and 
investment houses (e.g., Tuckett and Taffler, 2012, p.5).    
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Fund managers are fixed on the horns of a dilemma.  They “know” on one level that there is 
little empirical evidence they are able to do what is expected of them, but on the other hand 
have to believe it is nonetheless possible to deliver superior returns.  How they deal with this 
seemingly irreconcilable conflict and are able to make sense to themselves of what they do is a 
far more fundamental question and one we have sought to explore in this paper.
12
  
Finally, we must emphasize that fund managers are not the only group of economic agents that 
tell stories to make sense of what they do. Financial analysts, for example, employ very similar 
processes for sense-making using stories (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005). Their sense-making 
process is built around their differential reaction to good as opposed to bad news, a celebration 
of a firm’s change in direction, and a lack of a hard science of financial analysis based on the 
idea that the past holds most of the clues needed to predict future outcomes. Tuckett and Taffler 
(2012, p. 48) add “brokers, consultants, PR firms, journalists, economists, and just about 
everyone else in financial markets” to the list of economic agents who tell stories to make sense 
of what they do. We are just beginning to understand the important role storytelling plays, not 
only in maintaining the self-beliefs and professional activities of market participants, but also, 
by extension, in the continued functioning of financial markets. In fact, we echo Tuckett (2012) 
that financial markets may not be driven by different perceptions of asset valuation as is 
commonly viewed, but are fundamentally markets in stories. The ultimate question is, who tells 
the better story? But that, as they say, is the cue for another story! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Tuckett and Taffler (2012, pp. 95-97) in fact point out that investment professionals do a “workmanlike and 
valuable job for their clients”, but this differs to what their role is conventionally (wrongly) perceived to be. 
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Table 1: Four common story genres 
This table lists the four generic story genres commonly used in storytelling together with their characteristic 
attributes which sets them apart (Gabriel, 2000, pp. 83–84).  
 
 
Epic 
 
Tragic 
 
Comic 
 
Romantic 
Protagonist Hero Non-deserving victim Deserving victim, fool Love object 
Other characters 
Rescue object,      
assistant, villain 
Villain, supportive helper Trickster 
Gift-giver, lover,       
injured or sick person 
Plot focus 
Achievement, noble  
victory, success 
Undeserved misfortune, 
trauma 
Misfortune as deserved 
chastisement 
Love triumphant, 
misfortune conquered by 
love 
Predicament 
Contest, challenge,      
trial, test, mission,     
quest, sacrifice 
Crime, accident, insult, 
injury, loss, mistake, 
repetition,       
misrecognition 
Accident, mistake, 
coincidence, repetition,      
the unexpected and 
unpredictable 
Gift, romantic fantasy, 
falling in love, 
reciprocation,      
recognition 
Poetic tropes 
Agency 
Motive 
Credit 
Fixed qualities  
(nobility, courage,     
loyalty, selflessness,  
honour, ambition) 
 
Malevolent fate 
Blame 
Unity 
Motive (to the villain) 
Fixed qualities by 
juxtaposition  
(victim: noble, decent, 
worthy, good; villain:     
evil, devious, mean etc.) 
 
Providential significance 
Unity 
Agency before misfortune 
Denial of agency during 
misfortune 
Fixed qualities      
(pomposity, arrogance, 
vanity etc.) 
 
Emotion (loving, caring) 
Motive 
Credit (worthy love   
object) 
Fixed qualities       
(gratitude, caring, loving,   
vulnerable, pathetic) 
Emotions 
Pride, admiration,   
nostalgia, envy 
Sorrow, pity, fear,  anger, 
pathos 
Mirth, aggression, hate, 
scorn 
Love, care, kindness, 
generosity, gratitude, 
nostalgia 
 
 
Table 2: Story genres narrated by fund managers  
This table reports the number of distinct stories in each main genre based on our full sample, i.e. both interviews 
and formal reports. The numbers in brackets indicate the corresponding proportion in percentages. 
 
Story genres Interviews Formal Reports 
Epic 77 (45%) 27 (51%) 
Tragic 53 (31%) 19 (35%) 
Comic 16 (9%) 4 (8%) 
Romantic 26 (15%) 3 (6%) 
Total 172 (100%) 53 (100%) 
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Table 3: Typology of stories narrated by the sample fund managers in their interviews  
This table reports the frequent occurrence of two story genres (epic and tragic) and their main rhetorical elements 
based on a 30% random sample of our fund manager interviews, i.e., 15 interviews. 
 
Story elements Genres Contextual examples 
Number of 
stories 
Protagonist 
Epic 
 
The fund manager as the hero 
The fund as the hero 
 
14 
6 
Tragic 
 
The fund manager as the non-deserving victim 
The fund as the non-deserving victim 
 
5 
13 
Other characters 
 
Epic 
 
 
Clients 
Analysts (often as supporters) 
Company executives (often as supporters) 
The "market" (personified as supporter) 
 
3 
12 
7 
5 
Tragic 
 
Clients 
Analysts (often as mitigators) 
Company executives (often as mitigators) 
The "market" (personified as villain) 
 
3 
7 
5 
4 
 
Plot focus 
Epic 
 
Quest of identifying a mispriced security 
Noble victory of finding a mispriced security 
Noble victory of making positive returns 
 
8 
7 
4 
Tragic 
 
Trial of a misleading investment opportunity 
Undeserved misfortune with the investment process 
 
6 
5 
Predicament 
Epic 
 
Challenge of building consensus 
Challenge of acting against consensus 
Challenge of dealing with market downturns 
Challenge posed by short-termism 
 
3 
6 
8 
2 
Tragic 
 
Misrecognition of investment opportunity 
Misrepresentation of a company by its managers 
Challenge posed by unpredictable external events 
 
6 
4 
2 
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Challenge of dealing with stakeholders 
Challenge of closing a position at financial loss 
Challenge of dealing with associated trauma 
3 
4 
5 
 
Poetic tropes 
Epic 
 
Agency of the fund manager’s skills 
Attribution of (self-serving) causality 
Attribution of responsibility and credit 
Attribution of emotion 
 
9 
4 
5 
7 
Tragic 
 
Agency of malevolent fate 
Attribution of (self-serving) causality 
Attribution of blame to company executives 
Attribution of emotion 
 
4 
2 
6 
6 
 
Emotions 
 
Epic 
 
Pride in own ability and skills 
Pride in the team, analysts, etc. 
Satisfaction with the investment outcome 
Expectation of admiration for achievements 
 
3 
11 
10 
5 
Tragic 
 
Sorrow associated with the investment outcome 
Expectation of pity at the investment outcome 
Fear associated with occurrence of similar events 
Anger directed towards external factors 
 
7 
3 
3 
4 
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Table 4: Typology of stories narrated by sample fund managers in their formal reports  
This table reports the frequent occurrence of two story genres (epic and tragic) and their main rhetorical elements 
based on a 30% random sample of our fund manager reports i.e., 15 reports.  
 
Story elements Genres Contextual examples Number of stories 
Protagonist 
 
Epic 
 
The fund manager (often "I") as the hero 
The "fund" as the hero 
 
2 
5 
 
Tragic 
 
The fund manager (often "we") as the non-deserving victim 
The "fund" as the non-deserving victim 
 
3 
6 
 
Other characters 
 
Epic 
 
The "market" (personified as supporter) 
The regulator 
 
4 
3 
 
Tragic 
 
The "market" (personified as villain) 
The regulators 
 
4 
2 
 
Plot focus 
 
Epic 
 
Quest for a mispriced security/sector and the noble victory of finding it                        
Noble victory of gaining positive absolute returns 
Noble victory of beating the benchmark 
 
2
4 
5 
 
Tragic 
 
Trial of a misleading investment opportunity 
Undeserved misfortune with an investment process 
 
3 
2 
Predicament 
 
Epic 
 
Challenge of acting against consensus 
Challenge of dealing with market downturns and short-termism 
 
2 
3 
 
Tragic 
 
Challenge posed by unpredictable external events 
Challenge of closing a position at financial loss 
 
2 
1 
Poetic tropes 
 
Epic 
 
Agency of the fund manager’s skills 
Attribution of (self-serving) causality 
 
4 
2 
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Tragic Agency of malevolent fate 
Attribution of (self-serving) causality 
2 
3 
 
 
 
Emotions 
 
 
Epic 
 
Pride in own ability and skills 
Pride in the team, analysts, etc.                                           
Satisfaction with the investment outcome                         
Expectation of admiration for achievements 
 
2 
2 
4 
3 
Tragic 
 
Sorrow associated with the investment outcome                   
Fear associated with occurrence of similar events 
Anger/blame directed at external factors 
 
2 
1 
4 
 
 
